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COMMENTARY
CAREMARK AND COMPLIANCE: A TWENTY-YEAR
LOOKBACK
Donald C. Langevoort *
ABSTRACT
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Caremark was and is a
landmark decision. This brief Commentary takes a look back at Caremark on
three issues that pertain to its contemporary relevance inside the corporate
boardroom: (1) framing the cost-benefit assessment on the question of how much
to spend on compliance; (2) how and when to force certain compliance matters to
real-time board-level attention; and (3) using selection, promotion, and
compensation decisions to influence the culture and risk-taking “temperature” of
the firm.
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INTRODUCTION
In nearly all narratives of how compliance has grown as a legal subject and
field of practice in the last two decades, the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision
in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation1 plays a featured role.2

* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Caremark was endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court a
decade later in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), which obviously became the more
authoritative citation. Nonetheless, Caremark is the standard label in the literature and Delaware case
law, and so I will use it here. On extensions and limitations in the Caremark approach for risk
management beyond legal compliance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 985–90 (2009).
2. See, e.g., GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 55–61 (2014); John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in MODERN COMPLIANCE:
BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 29–30 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015)
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Chancellor William T. Allen’s opinion predicted the abandonment of the
Delaware Supreme Court’s older and heavily criticized approach in Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,3 which had limited the board of directors’
compliance oversight obligation to situations where red flags were waving in the
board’s face.4 It said (though entirely in dicta) that the board had an affirmative
obligation to assure itself in good faith that the corporation had a system of
internal reporting and compliance controls to monitor for illegal activities.5 Since
that time, compliance has grown in size, scope, and stature at nearly all large
corporations.6
There is a lively academic debate over whether Caremark’s causal impact
on the unmistakable growth curve of compliance has been overstated.7 After all,
the holding in the decision (approving a de minimis settlement) was that the
standard for holding directors of Delaware corporations liable for monetary
damages under a test requiring “sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise
oversight” would be exceedingly hard for plaintiffs to prove, which is not a
particularly threatening message.8 Plus, federal law had already been trending
strongly in the direction of a robust corporate compliance obligation in many
disparate fields of regulation (for example, antitrust, financial services,
healthcare, and defense contracting) and—as Caremark duly noted9—the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines had made the presence and quality of
compliance (including board oversight) a substantial factor in the size and
severity of any federal penalty for criminal wrongdoing.10 Within a few years
would come even bigger waves of pressure from Washington, via the emergence
of deferred prosecution agreements, corporate charging decisions, and—for
public companies—the mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.11 This required
new board structures, internal control processes, and whistleblower protections

(describing Caremark and its early influence).
3. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). Famously, the court rejected the idea that boards were obliged to
install a corporate system of “espionage” to spy on employee behavior. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
4. Id. at 130.
5. Id.
6. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 949–51
(2009); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Age of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2077 (2016).
7. See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 19 (2013). Similarly,
Jennifer Arlen says that Caremark failed to nudge boards sufficiently to make a difference and that it
took the accumulation of federal initiatives to make compliance a higher corporate priority. See
Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to
Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 324–25 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
8. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
9. Id. at 969.
10. See, e.g., Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing
Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 378–79 (1993).
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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to address the risk of financial misreporting, 12 which arises in the face of any
material corporate wrongdoing.13
Whatever its causality, Caremark no doubt did in its time focus the
attention of elite corporate lawyers, who used their considerable influence inside
the boardroom to grab the attention of directors and insist on more rigorous
internal procedures.14 As has happened with other seminal “message”
opinions,15 the lawyers probably trumpeted the dicta and subtly downplayed
how tiny the remaining liability risk was in order to upgrade compliance (a legal
function) as a corporate priority. It would be no surprise, then, if directors came
to believe that the Caremark threat was greater than the actual holding
indicated.
But we need not obsess over history. Caremark is at the very least a label
attached to what all now agree is a necessary and proper subject of attention for
every board of directors: corporate compliance as a function within the broader
task of enterprise risk management. In this brief Commentary, I want to address
some lingering issues that flow out of Caremark, touching on the nature and
design of compliance programs and the role of the board therein. None of this is
meant to be critical of Chancellor Allen or the opinion he authored, but rather to
identify ways in which what was said back then no longer suffices to address the
contemporary milieu of aggressive compliance.
As many corporate governance scholars have come to accept, corporations
are complex interactive systems of processes, routines, and feedback, the efficacy
of which cannot be taken for granted and hence becomes the crucial focus of the
CEO and senior management team.16 The overwhelming complexity is
daunting—perhaps beyond even the collective brainpower of the C-suite to
comprehend—yet can and must be managed to the extent possible. Like all
enterprise risks, compliance risks emerge, move, and change in ways not always
visible within the architectural sight lines of the firm.
It is at least arguable that independent directors do not have the capacity to
engage with this complexity, so that Caremark was wise to demand almost
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 268–72 (2004).
14. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 720 (2007).
15. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting lawyers about their advice to boards shortly after
Caremark); Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 2000, at
28, 32–37 (remarks of Ira Millstein); cf. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 375, 416 (1997)
(arguing that lawyers gain power vis-à-vis their clients in proportion to the seriousness of the legal
threat perceived by the client).
16. A relatively early expression of this is ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986),
especially Section 3.4.2 and Appendix A. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After
Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP.
L. 949, 950–52 (2006); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
459 (2003). More recently, the systems approach has been applied to help define a corporation’s legal
purpose in Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2018).
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nothing beyond asking that some compliance system exists. Independent boards
have limited time, attention, and expertise, which should thus be deployed only
when and where most useful. Yet government enforcers and standard setters
today insist on a much greater board role without necessarily defining how or
why it will be constructive. The remaining sections of my Commentary address
three possibilities: (1) framing the cost-benefit assessment on the question of
how much to spend on compliance; (2) forcing certain compliance matters to
real-time board-level attention; and (3) using selection, promotion, and
compensation decisions to influence the culture and risk-taking “temperature” of
the firm. None of these is unfamiliar as a subject within the now vast literature
on compliance, but I think there are still points and perspectives as to each that
both connect back to Caremark and deserve more attention.
I.

WAS CAREMARK MISLEADING?: TRADEOFFS AND EXTERNALITIES

For all the progress that has been made in both scholarly research and
practitioner sophistication about compliance, quantitative metrics that help
answer the basic questions—how much in the way of corporate resources should
be devoted to compliance and how should those resources best be deployed—are
elusive. Within the corporate control system, feedback with respect to high-level
risk events is (fortunately) not frequent enough to calibrate with precision. To be
sure, a brokerage firm, for example, can use changes in the number of regulatory
inquires and customer complaints as indicators that compliance strategies are
working or not, but these numbers can vary for any number of reasons and do
not necessarily capture larger, less frequent risks. Similarly, surveys and other
measurement tools regarding “ethical climate” can be helpful but leave open the
question of what, precisely, to do about any dark clouds. 17 Put simply, there is
always more that can be done in compliance—especially in the technology and
manpower for audit and surveillance18—and an unavoidable fear that should a
legal catastrophe happen, enforcers and the media will conclude in hindsight that
what was done was not enough. On the other hand, compliance is not a profit
center, making it hard to compete for funding with corporate functions that are,
especially when the focus is on the short term.
Caremark was quite clear that these resources and deployment choices are
matters of business judgment, and hence receive strong deference when made in
good faith. 19 This plays into the minimalist board role—from this perspective, it
suffices that management present its compliance plan for board-level feedback
and/or approval on a regular basis. A claim by management that additional
expenditures would not be cost-justified in light of its subjective risk assessment

17. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 970–71
(2017) [hereinafter Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance].
18. For an interesting set of thoughts about technology and the costs of compliance, see William
S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone (Univ. of Pa., Dep’t of Criminology, Working Paper
No.
2017-4.0,
2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034699
[perma:
http://perma.cc/A7WM-RVVL].
19. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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is presumptively reliable, all the more so if buttressed by an independent
consultant’s report. 20 Given the complexity of the compliance system (embedded
inside the even more complicated corporate operating system), these resource
allocations are hard for board members to question. Caremark certainly gives
them no reason to do so.
The court’s teaching that compliance is a matter of business judgment,
however, can easily be misleading. 21 It suggests that the cost-benefit tradeoffs are
made by reference to the long-run best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, so that the answer to the question “how much compliance is
enough” is when the costs to the corporation exceed the benefits to it in terms of
reduction in perceived risk. Indeed, that is conventional Delaware corporate
law.22 This is not to say that the board has the right to authorize illegal behavior
because it is likely to be profitable—intentional illegality is ultra vires and
outside the protection of the business judgment rule.23 But Caremark was
assuming the situation where there is no contemporaneous knowledge much less
approval of criminality at the board level, so that the lawsuit is simply about
efficient monitoring from a corporate (that is, shareholder) wealth perspective.
As Geoffrey Miller has demonstrated, such stress on business judgment is
troubling. From a regulator’s or enforcer’s perspective, the goal of a compliance
obligation is to cause corporations to invest in compliance up to the level where
the preventive costs equal the social harm caused by the wrongdoing, not the
harm to the corporation from being caught.24 Their judgment as to the adequacy
of expenditures (or compliance efforts as a whole) should thus be designed to
penalize firms that underinvest in legal precaution from a social risk perspective,
even if the judgment might be reasonable in terms of expected shareholder
value.
To illustrate, consider the portion of a compliance program focused on
foreign bribery as interdicted by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA).25 FCPA compliance is challenging, to be sure—the law is murky at
numerous points, regulators vary over time in the likelihood and severity of
enforcement, and the points of legal risk (opportunities for potentially unlawful
payments) are numerous. From a shareholder perspective, the risk of sanction
has to be taken very seriously, but so do the potential costs. And there is strong
evidence that, on average and over time, FCPA sanctions are significantly less

20. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371–72 (Del. 2006) (giving weight to consultant’s report
on bank’s anti-money laundering compliance efforts).
21. See Bullard, supra note 7, at 20–24.
22. E.g., Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating the
maximization of long term wealth of the corporation as only legitimate business objective).
23. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1172–73 (1977)
[hereinafter Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry].
24. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 254–55 (Jennifer
Arlen et al. eds., 2018); see also Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 937–39.
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
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than the money to be made when violations remain undetected.26 So even
though a board could not authorize or knowingly tolerate violations, it could
under Caremark choose to follow management’s preference for moderation in
how the firm deals with FCPA risks, without fear of state law fiduciary duty
liability.
All that changes, however, when we move from state law fiduciary duties to
federal or state regulatory enforcement.27 If a violation occurs and is detected,
the company may face increased sanctions if business judgment led it to invest
suboptimally in precaution. True, regulators and enforcers may err in their own
assessment of the cost-benefit tradeoffs, ignoring a multitude of indirect costs
and adopting a motivationally inflated view of benefits. Jennifer Arlen and
Marcel Kahan, for example, warn against regulators straying too far from the
norm of corporate efficiency in making judgments about compliance,28 and their
fears about institutional competence are reasonable. My impression is that
prosecutors have shown some naïveté in their faith in particular compliance and
governance strategies. But in principle, at least, regulators and enforcers who
have prosecutorial discretion and the ability to seek compliance-related sanction
adjustment have no reason to feel beholden to Caremark’s focus on corporate
well-being, and almost surely do not in fact.29
Instead, they will be looking to see a more active board-level engagement
that accepts that compliance is not simply a matter of looking out for the best
interests of the firm. This idea helps frame the kind of conversation that should
occur between management and the board. Credit for good compliance comes
when those in control of the company accept responsibility for the social harms
that come from wrongdoing and seek to identify and avoid them by all
reasonable means. To be clear, this is not an expectation that the board should
abandon its fiduciary responsibilities, but rather that it should recognize the
variable nature of the threat to the firm from poor compliance: a more severe
sanction that, rationally, justifies a higher level of precaution.
Of course, one might argue that management should understand this on its
own and take the (socially) optimal compliance precautions in the firm’s best
interests. But there are at least two sets of concerns to make us worry about
excessive managerial autonomy regarding compliance strictures, both now fairly
26. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Foreign Bribery: Incentives and Enforcement 3 (Apr. 7,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1573222
[perma:
http://perma.cc/G75K-S8JZ].
27. Once regulators start focusing on compliance, their standards soon become de facto
requirements, if not de jure ones. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 7, at 27–38. Bullard focuses on health
care as an example of federal preemption of compliance, but the same point can be made about many
other regulatory domains. Id.
28.
See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 327–28 (2017) (limiting compliance-related interventions to
wrongdoing indicating clear agency cost problems); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred
Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA.
L. REV. 1, 50–56 (2014) [hereinafter Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions]; Griffith, supra note 6, at
2105–06.
29. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 937–40.
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familiar. One is the presence of agency costs. For reasons having to do with
hiring, compensation, and retention incentives, executives face a cost-benefit
calculus for legal risk-taking that differs from the long-run best interest of the
firm. They may choose a strategy that creates risk of sanction for the company in
order to keep their jobs and perquisites.30 But the same kinds of pressures to
cheat may also arise from an excessive commitment to the firm’s best interests, as
where a cover-up is launched to avoid legal responsibility for something that has
gone wrong or to avoid loan defaults and the like that would occur if the hidden
problems were revealed. I (and others) have written extensively about what
motivates managerial misbehavior, and this vast debate need not be repeated
here.31 Suffice it to say that managerial motivations toward legal compliance are
not fully aligned with either the corporation’s best interests or the optimal
avoidance of social harm. Regulators’ hopes thus turn to the board of directors.
How well boards do here is open to question, given informational
imbalances and the boards’ own skewed incentive structure. 32 But some agenda
items for active discussion seem obvious. Today, especially, clawback provisions
in executive compensation packages are seen as an important risk-reducing
device, as to compliance and otherwise.33 To design an optimal clawback
requires careful consideration of the compliance risk environment and the
pressures that may motivate conscious or unconscious cheating behaviors. That
exercise itself is a valuable one, and should not be bottled up just in the work of
the compensation committee of the board.
We will turn to other things for boards to think about shortly. For now, I
would simply suggest that compliance oversight requires seeing how easily
management’s internal perspective can undervalue (and undermine) a truly
potent compliance structure, turning it into cosmetic compliance.34 The board
that wants full compliance credit if and when a violation occurs had better be
able to demonstrate awareness and response, and not simply wave the flag of
“business judgment.”
So, what about Caremark? The foregoing discussion and what is yet to come
go well beyond the holdings and dicta in Caremark and its Delaware corporate
law progeny. To be sure, dicta found in the opinion is meant to prompt some
30. Because of diffusion of knowledge and responsibility within complex firms, individual
prosecutions are less frequent, though by no means unlikely. My view, developed at length elsewhere,
is that psychology and culture make executives willing to engage in or tolerate noncompliance even
when rationally it might be prudent to obey the law. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE,
SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 33–
60 (2016).
31. Id.; see also, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 32; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry, supra
note 23.
32. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 30, at 90–91.
33. See generally Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721 (2011)
(detailing clawback provisions and discussing their prevalence).
34. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance
structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing
function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”).
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attention to the status of internal compliance. But this is all by way of what in the
end animates the Delaware corporate vision: it is up to the shareholders to elect
directors who care about their interests and monitor accordingly. As Chancellor
Allen says, there are limits on how sorry to feel for the shareholders if they fail
to do so and some compliance catastrophe occurs.35 By contrast, the evolving
regulatory vision of corporate compliance responsibilities is to see the harms
from corporate wrongdoing to persons with no franchise at all. On that
Caremark says naught, and thus seems a bit less relevant in modern optimal
compliance debates.
II.

WAS CAREMARK NAÏVE?: BOARD KNOWLEDGE AND DISTORTED
INFORMATION FLOW

Caremark was clear that the point of the obligation of inquiry was to make
it more likely that compliance and other risk-related information would come to
the attention of both senior management and the board so that they could carry
out their fiduciary responsibilities in an informed fashion.36 How to do so was
left to business judgment, and so once again there is relatively little guidance.
Although the court does acknowledge that no system can be fail-safe, the
opinion reads almost as if a competent system, once in place, should ordinarily
generate reliable information for all interested parties to process. It seems so
straightforward.
The reality is messier; compliance is always a struggle. Within the complex
corporate system, information is diffused among many parties. Often, no one
person or group will know enough to appreciate the full legal risk, and even if
they do, they may have incentives to conceal or distort. Work in organization
psychology emphasizes that these blind spots, blockages, and distortions are not
necessarily in bad faith (though they certainly are sometimes), but rather are the
byproduct of routinization that make the truth hard to discern.37 Further
complication arises from the subjective nature of law and legal risk. Law is often
full of ambiguity, even when factual questions are posed clearly. Feedback is
often lacking. As a result, legal risk-related information inside the firm is
constantly shifting, and subject to wishful thinking.
Many fascinating issues arise out of this messiness about how managers
construe legal risk, which scholars in law and the social sciences have been
studying for some time. For our purposes here, I want to focus on just one issue:
What is the right internal policy for when management should bring a legal
compliance matter to the attention of the board?
One subtle aspect of Caremark comes into play here. The Chancellor
stressed that no “red flags” had come to the attention of the board that did or

35. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
36. See id. at 967–68.
37. See Malloy, supra note 16, at 457–59; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld,
Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of
2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 813–14, 835–36 (2010).
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should have alerted them of the compliance risk.38 So what is the standard for
director liability for situations where there were red flags? In two widely noted
federal courts of appeals decisions applying Delaware law not long after
Caremark, the courts refused to dismiss cases against the board members
pending further factual inquiry into what the board members knew and how they
responded.39 Plaintiffs’ lawyers with Caremark type cases soon were working
hard to fill their complaints with numerous warning signs that the board should
have pursued.40
We need not determine here precisely what the law is with respect to red
flag cases (especially when the company has a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory
clause in its charter to protect directors from duty of care liability).41 All we need
to see for now is that the moment the board is brought into the compliance risk
discussion, liability exposure increases to at least a small extent, and Caremark
itself no longer sets the applicable standard. This shift may be even more
dramatic under federal law.42 Under the federal securities laws, for example,

38. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971–72.
39. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall
v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 826 (6th Cir.) amended on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001). The fact
that these cases were not decided by Delaware courts led plaintiffs to prefer non-Delaware venues for
Caremark type claims. This is no longer quite so easy due to charter or bylaw provisions mandating
that derivative claims be brought in Delaware courts. E.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by
Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016).
40. See, e.g., Verified Stockholders’ Derivative Complaint at 36, Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret.
Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-cv-6514) (applying Delaware law).
41. In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that
such cases require plaintiffs to show a conscious disregard of the compliance risk in the face of
whatever “red flags” information came to its attention, which is hardly an easy standard for plaintiffs
to meet. Id. at 370. And indeed, most such claims fail. See, e.g., In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA
Stockholder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 11152-VCMR, 2017 WL 2608723, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 16,
2017). But there have been cases where the flags were red enough to permit such an inference, and so
this remains the route of choice. See, e.g., Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys., 727 F.3d at 729–30
(applying Delaware law); In re Intuitive Surgical S’holder Derivative Litig., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1119
(N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2011). For a review and assessment of these red flag cases, see Ezra Wasserman Mitchell,
Caremark’s
Hidden
Promise
(Aug.
2,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3012419 [perma: http://perma.cc/UBU5-B7S4]. As a matter of Delaware
corporate law, many of the Caremark cases just cited were decided based on whether plaintiffs’ failure
to make demand on the board of directors to bring the suit is excused as futile, which is typically
resolved by reference to whether the directors face a significant threat of personal liability. That
inquiry, in turn, is complicated by the fact that most Delaware corporations have adopted charter
provisions under Section 102(b)(7) that exculpate directors from liability for breach of the duty of care
absent bad faith. DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2018). Indeed, Stone essentially adopts a
bad faith standard for all Caremark claims. Of course, even with a skeptical judiciary, the pressures to
settle may be considerable. For a more approving assessment of a Caremark claim once a settlement
agreement promises to terminate litigation, see In re Pfizer Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 780
F. Supp. 2d 336, 340–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
42. There can be substantial disclosure obligations with respect to compliance risks, especially
for public companies. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal
Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 768 (2016). The extent to which the
securities laws substitute more aggressively for weak state corporate law fiduciary duty principles is
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disclosure cases require a showing of scienter, which includes subjective
recklessness.43 Being brought into the loop provides evidence of this, and also
triggers a greater possibility of control person liability44 or (for securities firms)
“duty to supervise” liability.45
So, board members will not welcome any such escalation. No doubt there
are circumstances where the legal dangers are so imminent and large that failure
to escalate would be a clear breach of fiduciary duty on the part of whatever
senior managers knew of the risks—the duty of “candor inside the corporation”
about which I have written elsewhere.46 But given the messiness noted earlier,
many situations will be more ambiguous as to either the probability or the
magnitude of the risk. There, one can start imagining arguments for putting off
informing the board for the moment.
Take, for example, a situation where lawyers at a health care corporation
authorized a form of contractual arrangement with hospitals and pharmacies.
There were possible arguments for illegality, but the legal team made the
judgment that these economically beneficial deals would likely be upheld if
challenged. Subsequently, however, two things have changed. First, there is
evidence that certain sales staff have made informal modifications to the
approved arrangements that might be troubling, the extent of which at this point
has not yet been determined. Secondly, federal regulators have become notably
more aggressive in pursuing cases involving marketing practices. Right now, the
legal team is quietly investigating and has asked the sales department to stop the
practice of one-off modifications. So, who should know this, and by what means?
Suppose the company then gets a request from federal regulators inquiring about
sales and marketing practices, via a letter being sent out to a large number of
firms in the industry. Or a specific request to discuss such practices with
enforcement staff from the regulators or the Department of Justice. What about
a subpoena?
There is no obvious answer under these varying facts, at least until the
subpoena. But I can easily imagine this kind of information getting bottled up,
with potentially unfortunate consequences for the company. This is a sensitive
matter over which the lawyers want control, and sharing complete information
well documented. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s
Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450–52 (2001); Robert B. Thompson &
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 859, 860–61 (2003).
43. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 706–09 (8th ed. 2017).
44. See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to
Enforce Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 212 (2017) (“Control person liability
may also be extended to lower level managers and department heads if they exercised the requisite
amount of control over the primary violator(s).”).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012); James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A
Reorientation in Compliance for Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1143–48.
46. Officers who intentionally keep directors in the dark on an important matter are almost
surely violating fiduciary and agency law responsibilities. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law
Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2003).
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with a widening circle of corporate officials necessarily diminishes that control.
No doubt there is some belief, realistic or not, that the problem can be made to
go away by distancing the company from the now-riskier practice without
drawing attention to the matter. In the background—conscious or not—is
accountability and self-interest. Potentially, the lawyers are to blame either for
originally providing imprudent legal advice or for failing to understand what was
really happening and not adjusting their advice in light of new circumstances.
Human nature is to double down, via what psychologists call “defensive
bolstering”: increasing one’s commitment to the original decision.47 The lawyers
may try to find sympathetic outside counsel to concur. All of this may diminish
the perceived compliance risk and thus understate the actual risk.
This is a test of character and competence for the lawyers, and there is
considerable variation in how chief legal officers will perform.48 The Caremark
related question is whether the board should, as a matter of policy, insist that it
be brought into matters like these and, if so, how and when. The Caremark
opinion again says nothing, so that once more it is a matter of good faith business
judgment. If that is all, then it is probably safe to assume that most boards will
allow senior management to exercise discretion on what to report up, with the
implicit understanding that compliance matters are for management to handle
and only extraordinary circumstances should require board attention. That is not
entirely unreasonable. Legal compliance is not specifically within the expertise of
most board members, and there will not necessarily be productive conversations
in this highly scripted portion of the meeting beyond the exhortation that the
matter be handled properly.
Today, however, I doubt that well-advised boards take this position (though
some probably wish they could).49 The reason, once again, stems mainly from
pressures from regulators and enforcers at the federal level who have come to
believe in the value of a stronger board-level presence in compliance. 50 The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission principles, and numerous regulatory
pronouncements seek not only board approval of written policies and
procedures and key compliance personnel decisions, but also a much more
interactive involvement that includes reporting lines running from the chief
compliance officer (and perhaps chief legal officer) directly to the board,
unfiltered by senior executives.51 While these are rarely so specific as to define

47. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability:
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 634 (1989).
48. See generally BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION (2016) (describing the increase in the chief legal officer’s importance
and authority in the corporate sphere over the past twenty years). For an economics perspective on
these developments, see generally Robert C. Bird et al., The Role of the Chief Legal Officer in
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (2015).
49. See Rebecca Walker & Jeff Kaplan, Reporting to the Board on the Compliance and Ethics
Program, COMPLIANCE & ETHICS PROF., June 2014, at 59, 64–65.
50. E.g., Griffith, supra note 6, at 2107–09.
51. These are discussed extensively in practice-oriented compliance treatises. E.g., JEFFREY
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the time frame or materiality threshold for reporting up, the assumption seems
to be that boards want and need awareness and involvement on an accelerated
basis as to significant compliance risks. Otherwise, the board will too often be
the last to know.
As noted earlier, many scholars and practitioners have criticized federal
regulators and enforcers for naïvely assuming the virtues of certain corporate
governance interventions without proof that they really work or are without
significant costs. 52 To them, Caremark’s legacy of minimalism and deference is to
be celebrated—private ordering will do better at getting compliance
responsibilities to the right place. Under normal governance conditions, the
board and the management team will work out an acceptable understanding for
when compliance matters are to be escalated, a decision which need not be
second-guessed simply because it tilts heavily toward managerial prerogative.
What we see here is something of a replay of Section I. The contemporary
federal perspective seems to be that management is too often inclined to ignore
or bury compliance warnings and risks and cover up when events pass the
illegality threshold. Forcing more board-level involvement early on is the only
practicable alternative at the highest level of the firm, naïve or not. Hence the
emphasis on real-time interaction not only with senior management but the chief
legal and compliance officer, supplemented by the positioning of legal and
compliance personnel in key committees and organization chart checkpoints, so
that there are more routes by which information can indeed reach the board and
force it to respond. 53
Nothing guarantees that this will actually happen—sound information flow
practices on paper are often enough frustrated in practice. But the evidence we
have on independent director presence does suggest some efficacy in reducing
firm-level risk and instilling a better attitude toward compliance.54 As corporate
governance norms continue to move in the direction of board empowerment and
professionalization, we cannot readily dismiss the possibility that the
“information forcing” function associated with the burdens and responsibilities
of added board-level compliance will do some good.55
This is also consistent with the approach to compliance that focuses on the
optimal expenditure of resources to avoid social harm, not just harm to the
corporation and its shareholders. Presumably, independent directors are more
likely than insiders to accept the legitimacy of societal demands for caution over
risk-taking when the harms from corporate wrongdoing are spread widely while
KAPLAN & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE O RGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES (2015 ed.).
52. E.g., Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions, supra note 28.
53. For a good survey of these kinds of mandatory reforms, see generally Wulf A. Kaal &
Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate
Governance: Evidence from 1995–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1817, 1835–36 (2007) (discussing “speed bump” from independent director involvement in risk
management).
55. See Sale & Langevoort, supra note 42, at 787–88.
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its profits are thoroughly internalized in the form of salaries, bonuses, dividends,
and stock price appreciation. Or such is the normative expectation, even if not all
independent directors have yet gotten the message.
III. WAS CAREMARK INCOMPLETE?: INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE CULTURES
When Caremark was decided, the neoclassical law and economics
scholarship was still fairly dominant. Its stress on rationality and market
efficiency readily led to private ordering solutions to corporate law problems,
including compliance. If legal sanctions are set correctly, the firm—and those
whose interests are aligned with the firm—have sufficient incentives to seek to
avoid violations via an efficient level of internal compliance. If legal sanctions
are instead set too low or are underenforced, under this view it is not the
corporation’s problem to solve.
Much has changed since then. Today, as we have seen, compliance
expectations are much higher, not tied to the corporation’s narrow self-interest.56
But scandals continue to grab headlines. Part of the reason for compliance
failure, no doubt, is because there are still positive returns to wrongdoing
because of underenforcement.57 But the risks to high-level officials from
corporate prosecutions and regulatory sanctions go beyond fines and penalties—
stock prices drop, the firm suffers reputational harm, and more. Boards are more
likely to fire the CEO or subordinates out of anger or frustration, or at least
reduce their pay.58 There are ample disincentives to corporate illegality, all of
which should have a robust deterrence effect.
Perhaps the biggest change in thinking about compliance since Caremark is
the realization that unhealthy corporate cultures can defeat even the most wellintentioned preventatives installed by senior management and the board.59
Indeed, the phrase “culture of compliance” has become standard in describing
what regulators and enforcers now want to see.60 And this goes well beyond
anything that can be described in a set of policies and procedures, tonal speeches
from the top, or written statements of values and ethics.
We are increasingly coming to see how and why ethical and legal lapses
occur. Corporate cultures are belief systems—transmitting to loyal, committed
managers and employees a sense of what is valued, and what is denigrated. They
help coordinate the activities of numerous stakeholders, an essential task in

56. See supra Section I.
57. See supra notes 25–27.
58. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1032–40 (2010).
But see Messod D. Beneish et al., Explaining CEO Retention in Misreporting Firms, 123 J. FIN. ECON.
512, 515–17 (2017) (explaining that outside directors may not actually be incentivized to make “valuemaximizing decisions”).
59. There is now a large body of literature on this. See, e.g., David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures
and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 351–59 (2016); Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance,
supra note 17, at 943–46.
60. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 940–44.
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making the complex corporate system function. When corporations are under
immense competitive pressure to succeed (often driven by shareholders), belief
systems can become facilitators for what it takes to survive and thrive—the
grease in the corporate machinery. When circumstances create temptations to
behave illegally, those beliefs can provide rationalizations that explain why what
is profitable is also morally acceptable, via what psychologists call “motivated
inference.”61 Once these kinds of rationalizations take hold, wrongdoing starts to
happen—first in small steps, then in bigger ones.62
It is a difficult managerial task to simultaneously drive profits and growth
while preserving a strong sense of compliance. Typically, the former is directly
rewarded via raises and promotions and the latter more through exhortations
and soft praise, if that. Compliance professionals have come to appreciate the
immensity of the task and the need to prevent the memes that reverberate
through the corporate culture from enabling dangerous beliefs that stimulate
legal risk-taking, which is not an easy task.
Caremark gives no hint of any of this, though that is not a criticism. At the
time, culture and norms were not central to thinking about governance or
compliance. Today they are, with regulators and enforcers willing—for better or
worse—to pass judgment on a company’s ethical climate when deciding whether
to charge the corporation or just individuals, or how big a fine to seek. The
lesson is an important one as they work through their growing number of
compliance-related assignments. As I put it recently in a survey of compliance
cultures:
In the end, the most important message about cultures of compliance is
for corporate leaders and, especially, for boards of directors. It is much
too easy to look around and see good people working hard at difficult
jobs and assume that a good compliance culture exists simply because
everyone has been warned of the damage that can come from getting
caught doing wrong. Or worse, to assume that an observable
abundance of intensity, loyalty and creativity are signs that all is
good. 63
We have seen wrongdoing emerge from within the most celebrated of
companies, often when—and perhaps because—boards engaged in their own
sort of motivated inference, failing to appreciate that it was time to turn down
internal corporate temperature a bit before things got out of control.
One small irony, however, comes from Caremark’s curt dismissal of
Graham’s warning against fiduciary duty leading to intracorporate espionage.64
Today, those fears are very much still with us, all the more so as technology
creates surveillance tools unimaginable in 1996, much less 1963. Surveillance
61.
See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting
Egotistically, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 191–95 (2016).
62.
See, e.g., John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1177–81 (2005) (discussing the erosion of an
organization’s commitment to compliance).
63. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 17, at 977 (footnote omitted).
64. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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intensity, as many have pointed out, may be effective at promoting command
and control, but comes at a cost in terms of a culture of trust and integrity that is
hard to measure but very much worth worrying about.65
CONCLUSION
Caremark’s legacy today takes two forms. It remains part of the canon of
authorities regularly cited as the impetus to taking compliance seriously in
boardrooms and executive suites, and it still generates a steady flow of litigation,
if not significant recoveries, by shareholders of companies that suffered the
trauma of a compliance failure. But it is also cited and embraced by critics of the
federal presence who see unchecked costs to the obsession with compliance and
wish to return to more business judgment deference to boards and managers, not
federal bureaucrats, on how best to design and implement compliance systems.
Chancellor Allen was no ideologue, and he understood that he was
addressing only the shareholder litigation piece of the far larger compliance
puzzle. In extrajudicial writings, he was sensitive to the biases and distorted
incentives that plague high-stakes corporate decisionmaking, hoping that
independent lawyers, directors, and others understood the need to step up
regardless of the diminished liability threat.66 Those thoughts have even more
resonance today, as the short-term market pressures on corporations have grown
all the more intense.67 They are strongly felt in the boardroom. But there are
also countervailing pressures in the direction of “publicness”: the societal
expectations that economically powerful entities have an obligation to temper
the risks they take when the harms from bad decisions are felt outside corporate
boundaries. Compliance is a crucial part of this, which the Chancellor
understood and wanted to promote as much as he could within the restrictive
confines of the case before him. To be clear, I do not think that Caremark was
misleading, naïve, or incomplete. The Chancellor knew that if boards failed to
become more sophisticated and sensitive to doing this well—the cultural part as
well as the policies and procedures—external pressures would continue to grow
65. Heavy monitoring itself produces reactance, frustrating compliance. Inculcating a sense of
trust is necessary for optimal behavior, yet trust will sometimes be abused. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 71, 72; Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key Research
Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 297 (2014); see also Fanto, supra note 45, at 1123–24; Todd
Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1218–23 (2017); Scott
Killingsworth, Behavioral Ethics: From Nudges to Norms, ETHIKOS, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 1, 1–5; Milton
C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 981–82 (2007).
66. See generally, e.g., William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of
Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing the various modern tensions inherent in the
role of a business attorney).
67. Such market pressures include activist investors, whose influence does not appear to be
integrity producing regardless of its immediate impact on the issuer’s stock price. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Preserving the Corporate Superego in a Time of Stress: An Essay on Ethics and Economics, 33
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 221, 231–34 (2017); Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How
Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 3 (Oct. 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 [perma: http://perma.cc/42NX-AXET].
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without regard to cost or efficiency. That is even more so today.
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